

Impact of Russian propaganda in Estonia and Lithuania

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Introduction

The twenty-first century has witnessed a renewed interest in propaganda, its role, and the potential to diminish its influence. This interest, particularly evident in the transatlantic region and Europe, is driven by Russia's efforts to extend its global reach through both military and non-military means. The appeal of non-military strategies is due to their relatively low costs and the challenges of countering Russian information tactics, including propaganda, within democratic political systems.

Russia's information operations drew increased attention following the onset of the war in Ukraine in 2014. During this conflict, Russia employed both military force and a widespread disinformation campaign, prompting concerns about the application of similar techniques in other former USSR territories. It is believed that Russia uses its propaganda to depict targeted countries unfavorably, aiming to weaken their military resistance and reduce public pressure on decision-makers in NATO member states.

The Baltic states are considered highly vulnerable to Russia's non-military threats. This vulnerability is influenced by several factors: the significant presence of an East Slavic population in these societies, decades of Russian efforts to protect the interests of this group according to Russian perspectives, and the widespread knowledge of the Russian language and media consumption habits in the Baltic region, which naturally increase their susceptibility to Russian propaganda.

Various studies have identified the messages conveyed by Russian media to audiences in the Baltic countries. However, the factors that enhance receptiveness to these messages remain unclear. Is it merely a matter of exposure to Russian media? Are certain demographics more inclined to accept Russian propaganda? How do perceptions of government performance influence individual openness to these messages?

This study will focus on Estonia and Lithuania. Both countries share a number of similarities – the size of territory and population; the level of economic development; experience of the Soviet past; membership in the European Union and NATO. However, they are distinguished by different ethnic structures – Estonia has a sizeable Russian minority (around 25 per cent of population) but Lithuania is ethnically more homogeneous and Russians constitute only five per cent of the population, being the second largest minority after Poles.

Methodology

This study is based on a quantitative survey of adult populations in Estonia and Lithuania. Respondent samples that are representative of 18-74 year old populations in both countries were surveyed by means of online interviewing. The fieldwork was carried out by Norstat in June 2024. In Estonia, 1202 interviews were completed. In Lithuania, 1500 interviews were completed.

Respondents were asked about their habits of media consumption as well as their attitudes towards a range of statements, many of which resembled messages conveyed by the Russian propaganda. In addition, standard questions about a respondent's socioeconomic background were asked (age, education, ethnicity, income etc.).

Linear regression analysis was employed to establish statistically significant associations among variables (f.ex., media consumption, political attitudes etc.) and to test the explanatory power of various regression models.

Main findings

The principal aim of this study is to analyze the penetration of the Estonian and Lithuanian societies by a range of Russian propaganda messages by means of representative surveys of professionally recruited respondent panels.

In both countries, internet portals in the languages of the titular nations have become the main channel of information closely followed by social media and television broadcasts. The language spoken at home is strongly linked to the language of media that are consumed by the respondents.

Seven messages communicated or implied by the Russian propaganda are included in this study. Despite the Russian information efforts, populations of both countries demonstrate a high commitment to resisting a foreign invasion. The actual willingness to fight for their countries is lower. While NATO military presence in the two countries is dominantly seen as a positive contribution to security, Estonia's population is dramatically more pessimistic about NATO providing protection in the case of an actual invasion.

Notable segments of both societies believe in Europe's moral decay and some are inclined to regard Ukraine as anti-Russian project supported by the West in order to destabilize Russia. The resurgence of fascism is noted slightly more in Estonia than in Lithuania.

Media consumption patterns explain relatively little of the receptiveness of the Russian messages. However, the media effect is generally larger in Estonia. A more intensive use of Russian-language media, particularly TV and radio, is often associated with a greater support for the Russian messages.

Socio-demographic factors (age, gender etc.) tend play a smaller role in explaining support for the Russian messages. In Estonia, however, demographics is more significant than in Lithuania. The language spoken at home and person's gender are among the most frequent variables of significance.


Political attitudes and evaluations of political performance have the largest explanatory power for the receptiveness of the Russian propaganda in both countries. Confidence in the country's armed forces along with the perception of treatment of ethnic minorities play and the assessment of life under the Soviet regime are the most important factors affecting attitudes towards the Russian propaganda.

Estonia

Consumption of traditional media in Estonia

About one in five Estonia's residents reads print media in Estonian on a daily basis (see Graph 1), which is above the European average of 20 per cent.


Graph 1.



Base: all respondents, N=1202

However, the circulation of print media in Russian is much narrower as only four per cent of respondents indicated they read this kind of print media on a daily basis (see Graph 2).

Graph 2.




Base: all respondents, N=1202

A few demographic groups are particularly keen on consuming print media in Estonian – people with high income, persons older than 60 years of age, respondents who speak Estonian at home. However, the print media in Russian is more often read by low-income persons, respondents above 40 years of age, and people who speak Russian at home. There is only a miniscule readership overlap between the Estonian and Russian print media.

Watching television is a considerably more popular activity as two fifths of Estonia’s adult population watch TV broadcasts in Estonian on a daily or nearly daily basis (see Graph 3). Another 10 per cent watch TV in Estonian every other day.


Graph 3.



Base: all respondents, N=1202


This stands in stark contrast to watching TV broadcasts in Russian – only six per cent watch Estonian public TV broadcasts in Russian (ETV+) on a daily or nearly daily basis (see Graph 4) and another five per cent watch broadcasts from Russia (see Graph 5). It is important to note that access to TV from Russia is notably restricted in Estonia after Russia expanded its war in Ukraine in 2022. A range of Russian official channels are banned on the territory of Estonia in order to limit the impact of Russian propaganda in the country. The ban was introduced in 2022.

Graph 4.



Base: all respondents, N=1202

Graph 5.




Base: all respondents, N=1202

ETV+ is more often watched by people over 50 years of age, female respondents, people in lower income brackets, persons speaking Russian at home. Broadcasts from Russia are more often favored by 40-60 year olds, men, ethnic Russians or people speaking Russian at home, people with lower income and higher education.

Listening to radio broadcasts in Estonian is about as popular as watching TV broadcasts in Estonian – two in five people entertain radio broadcasts on a daily or nearly daily basis (see Graph 6). Another 13 per cent do it every other day.


Graph 6.



Base: all respondents, N=1202

The appeal of radio broadcasts in Russian is much smaller as only six per cent of respondents reported listening to radio in Russian on a daily or nearly daily basis (see Graph 7).

Graph 7.



Base: all respondents, N=1202


Estonian radio broadcasts are more appealing for persons over 60 years of age, men, people speaking Estonian at home, respondents with higher income. Radio broadcasts in Russian are more popular among 40-60 year old persons, men, people speaking Russian at home, respondents with lower income.

To sum up, TV broadcasts in Estonian are the more popular among the traditional media closely followed by radio broadcasts in Estonian. Russian traditional media are reported to have a small usage that appears disproportionate to the share of Slavic minorities in the country.

News consumption of digital media in Estonia

The rapid development of information and communication technologies (ICT) has enabled an explosive growth of digital media that have swiftly become a dominant channel of information including news and current events. This trend is clearly visible in Estonia where more than half of adult population on a daily basis acquire information about current events from internet portals in Estonian (see Graph 8).

Graph 8.




Base: all respondents, N=1202

The daily acquisition of news from portals in Estonian is more characteristic of men, people who speak Estonian at home, respondents with higher income and higher education. Curiously enough, the daily usage of portals for the purpose of following current events is not related to any specific age group.

Similarly, portals in Russian are the most popular source of information about current events among Russian-language sources. Some 15 per cent of respondents use these portals on a daily basis to follow news (see Graph 9).

Graph 9.




Base: all respondents, N=1202

The daily acquisition of news from portals in Russian is more characteristic of respondents over 40 years of age, people who speak Russian at home, respondents with low income but higher education. Curiously enough, the daily usage of portals for the purpose of following current events is not related to any gender.

The growth of ICT including data transmission infrastructure facilitated the spread of what is now known as social media (Facebook, Instagram, TikTok etc.). Estonian residents are quite active in using social media to acquire news and information about current events as two in five respondents do so in Estonian on a daily basis (see Graph 10), which is comparable to the activity in the Anglo-Saxon countries.

Graph 10.




Base: all respondents, N=1202

Those who use social media to follow news more frequently are 30-39 year olds, women, people who speak Estonian at home, wealthier respondents.

Social media in Russian also are a very important source of information about current events as 13 per cent of respondents follow the news on those social media on a daily basis.

Graph 11.




Base: all respondents, N=1202

Those who use social media in Russian to follow news more frequently are 40-59 year olds, women, people who speak Russian at home, low- and medium-income respondents.

Various communication applications (Telegram, WhatsApp etc.) constitute an even more recent way of acquiring information about current local and global events. Almost a quarter of respondents indicated they used communication apps in Estonian to follow the news (see Graph 12).

Graph 12.




Base: all respondents, N=1202

Those who use communication apps to follow news in Estonian more frequently are 18-29 year olds, women, people who speak Estonian at home, respondents with higher personal income. Thus, communication apps emerge as a more popular channel of information if there is a need to communicate with younger segments of the Estonian society.

One in eleven residents uses communication apps to follow current events in Russian (Graph 13). Those who use communication apps to follow news in Russian more frequently are 40-49 year olds, people who speak Russian at home, persons with low personal income and low household income as well as with higher education.

Graph 13.



Base: all respondents, N=1202

Responsiveness to Russian propaganda


Russia has been keen to maintain certain influence over countries that used to be parts of the Soviet Union. It coined the concept of ‘near abroad’ to provide an ideological justification and a geopolitical strategy employed by Russia to describe its relationship with the fourteen independent states that (re)emerged following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russia regards these states as part of its historical sphere of influence due to history and select cultural aspects. Importantly, many of these countries have significant Russian-speaking populations and cultural connections to Russia.

It is important to note that Russia seeks to exert its political influence over these countries to ensure friendly governments that align with its foreign policy goals. This influence is achieved through various means, including diplomatic pressure, economic incentives, and support for pro-Russian political movements.

One of the ways to maintain its influence is to sway the mood of the general public Russia’s way by means of relentless propaganda. The Baltic countries that swiftly defined their pro-Western political orientation and made tremendous and successful efforts to join a range of international arrangements including the European Union and NATO became targets of the Russian propaganda efforts. While the concept of the near abroad was elevated to a new level after the 2008 war in Georgia and the start of the Russian invasion to Ukraine in 2014, the societies of the Baltic countries received a fairly constant set of Russian messages communicated in various ways. These messages focused on the indecisiveness of the West should a military conflict between Russia and NATO break out, on the weak performance of Baltic governments and their inability to provide public goods, and on weakening of the will of the Balts to fight in the case of a military conflict.

One of the ideas promoted by the Russian propaganda is that Estonia is a small country and should a conflict with Russia arise, a military resistance would bear no fruit and would greatly harm Estonia’s population. However, nearly half of Estonia’s adult population firmly believe that a resistance to a foreign invasion does make sense and another quarter gravitate towards this belief (see Graph 14).


Graph 14.



Base: all respondents, N=1202

While there is a strong belief among Estonia's population that a foreign invasion needs to be resisted, the actual willingness to defend the country in an armed manner is much less pronounced as only one in five respondents say they are willing to fight for Estonia (see Graph 15).


Graph 15.



Base: all respondents, N=1202

The indecisiveness of Western powers during the war in Ukraine adds arguments for a long-standing Russian message that NATO will not protect Estonia in the event of military invasion. More than a quarter of Estonia's population clearly side with this assessment and another 40 per cent gravitate towards supporting it (see Graph 16).


Graph 16.



Base: all respondents, N=1202

However, more than two fifths of Estonia's population believe that NATO's military presence in Estonia strengthens the country's security.


Graph 17.



Base: all respondents, N=1202

Russia has often cast itself as a moral stronghold vis-à-vis what it defines as a moral decay of the Western civilization. This idea has some traction in Estonia as 13 per cent of the country's residents fully agree with the decay thesis and another quarter tends to agree with it (see Graph 18).


Graph 18.



Base: all respondents, N=1202

One of the alternatives advocated by the Russian propaganda is the Soviet past that is presumed to be free of the ills of a capitalist society. However, only six per cent of Estonia's population believe that life under the Soviet regime was better than in the contemporary Estonia.


Graph 19.



Base: all respondents, N=1202

Russia makes frequent references to its role in World War II and in defeating fascism that came at a high price. Therefore, Russia reacts impatiently to what it sees as a return of anything fascist and uses the reproach of a re-emergence of fascism as an indication of serious criticism of countries in what Russia sees as its sphere of influence. Despite not infrequent complaints about Estonia, only six percent of the country's adult residents fully agree with the assessment that fascism is on the rise in Estonia (see Graph 20) and another 11 per cent tend to agree with this assessment. Equally important is the fact that 17 per cent of respondents found it impossible to define their attitude towards the idea of rising fascism in Estonia.


Graph 20.



Base: all respondents, N=1202

A relatively recent idea that is floated by Russia is that Ukraine as a country is an anti-Russian project generously supported by the West with the aim of destabilizing or even destroying Russia. It appears that this idea is used to justify a further invasion in Ukraine and the huge costs that this invasion involves. However, this idea has a somewhat limited support among Estonia's population (eight per cent fully agree and another 14 per cent rather agree with such a statement) (see Graph 21).

Graph 21.



Base: all respondents, N=1202

Russia's influence in the world

As the war in Ukraine continues, Russia faces various challenges. On the one hand, it needs to mobilize resources for military purposes under the circumstances of economic sanctions introduced by a group of industrially advanced countries. This limits the ability to extract profits from Russian exports of natural resources and makes Russia to accept contracts on presumably unfavorable terms weakening the country also in a longer run. On the other hand, the limited economic activity on a par with less than efficient military raises questions about Russia's ability to achieve its political goals. Also, the Russian mode of waging the war in Ukraine has prompted some to reevaluate the greatness of Russian culture.

It is against this background that the perception of Russia in Estonia was studied. First, questions about the current influence of Russia in global economy, world politics, and global culture and science were posed to respondents. On a scale from 0 to 10, respondents yielded an arguably modest evaluation of 5.9 points for Russia's economic influence in the world (see Graph 22).

Graph 22.



Base: all respondents, N=1202

Russia's current influence in world politics is rated slightly higher than that in the global economy as the mean global political influence stands at 6.6 points (see Graph 23).


Graph 23.



Base: all respondents, N=1202

Russia’s global cultural influence has received an average evaluation of 4.7 points (see Graph 24).

Graph 24.




Base: all respondents, N=1202

In an effort to tap into the dynamics of assessments of Russia’s influence, respondents were asked to indicate how the global role of Russia had changed over the last three years (with a view on the intensification of war in Ukraine in 2022).

Three in ten respondents noted a varying increase of Russia’s influence in the global economy (see Graph 25). On the other hand, nearly half of respondents believe Russia’s economic influence has actually diminished.


Graph 25.



Base: all respondents, N=1202

When it comes to Russia’s political significance on the global stage, two in five respondents see it rising (see Graph 26) while only one third of respondents believe this influence diminished.


Graph 26.



Base: all respondents, N=1202

Perhaps the most serious blow was dealt to Russia’s global cultural influence as an absolute majority of Estonia’s population believe that this influence has decreased over the last three years (see Graph 27).

Graph 27.



Base: all respondents, N=1202

Factors related to the influence of Russia's propaganda

Survey data show that public support to Russian propaganda messages varies as does perception of Russia's role in the contemporary world. On the one hand, two in three residents of Estonia have doubts whether NATO will protect the country in a case of foreign invasion. On the other, only 17 percent have noticed that fascism is on the rise in Estonia. This variation is noteworthy and calls for an explanation. Therefore, this study employs three groups of factors that previous research has associated with persuasive communication.

Given that about a quarter of Estonia's population identify as Russians and about half of Estonian population speaks Russian, there is a potentially large audience for the Russian media that arguably aim to influence popular views in Estonia. Therefore, it is assumed that a more intensive consumption of Russian-language media will be associated with attitudes that are closer to Russian propaganda messages. The ban on certain Russian TV broadcasters on the Estonian soil lends additional support for that assumption.

There is a substantial body of research demonstrating the role of sociodemographic characteristics in media consumption and in the reception of media contents. For example, people with higher income are more likely to consume paid contents and people with higher levels of formal education are more likely to consume sophisticated media contents. Based on this body of research, it is hypothesized that people who use Russian language at home are more likely to be sympathetic towards the messages of the Russian propaganda.

Popular attitudes towards political issues are conditioned by people's perception of government performance and political values. For example, it is demonstrated that socially conservative attitudes towards issues like prostitution, abortion or euthanasia are related to the willingness to fight for one's country. Also, a positive perception of how the government of a country functions in providing various public goods has been shown to be related to a rejection of extremist views. In view of these findings, it is assumed that a negative evaluation of the Estonian government performance will be associated with a greater openness towards the Russian propaganda.

In order to scrutinize the significance of the above factors, four models of linear regression are developed. The first model (abbreviated as SD) contains social demographic factors only – age, gender, language spoken at home, income, and level of formal education. A next model (abbreviated as MC) focuses on media consumption and factors in the frequency of use of both traditional and digital media. Another model (abbreviated as PA) includes popular attitudes towards a range of political issues – government

performance evaluation, treatment of ethnic minorities, perceptions of life under the Soviet regime, confidence in Estonia's military, and a cumulative index of conservative attitudes. And a final model integrates all the variables from the three models.

Quantitative results of the regression analysis in the form of standardized Beta coefficients are provided in the appendix of this report.

It makes sense to resist foreign invasion

Model MC (media consumption) demonstrates a modest explanatory power – adjusted R-squared stands at 0.258. The direction of association with independent variables is largely in line with the expectations. Heavier consumers of Russian-language media tend to side with the Russian propaganda idea of senseless resistance to foreign invasion while heavier users of Estonian-language media hold an opposite view. Statistically significant at .05 level are factors such as Estonian TV and portals in Estonian, on the one hand, and Russian TV and Russian radio broadcasts, on the other.

Socioeconomic factors (Model SD) has a slightly smaller explanatory power (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.224). As expected, speaking Estonian at home is a large and statistically significant predictor of support for resistance to foreign invasion as are older age and higher personal income of respondents.

Political attitudes (Model PA) explain the variance in attitudes towards resistance considerably better (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.400). The perceptions that Estonia has a reliable military, Estonia is better than many countries, and ethnic minorities are treated well in Estonia have positive and statistically significant association with the attitude towards resistance. Moreover, respondents who believe that life in the Soviet times was better are considerably more reluctant to support resistance to foreign invasion.

The explanatory power of the combined model joining together variables in all three previous models increases marginally (adjusted R-squared 0.404). However, some variables become statistically less significant but listening to Russian radio broadcasts, having confidence in the Estonian military, appreciating the treatment of ethnic minorities and Estonia itself remain the most important predictors.

I am willing to fight for Estonia

Model MC (media consumption) demonstrates a small explanatory power – adjusted R-squared stands at 0.166. The direction of association with independent variables is largely in line with the expectations. Heavier consumers of Russian-language media tend to refrain from committing to fighting for Estonia while heavier users of Estonian-language media hold an opposite view. Statistically significant at .05 level are factors such as Estonian TV and ETV+, portals in Estonian, on the one hand, and Russian TV and Russian radio broadcasts, on the other. However, heavier use of social media in Estonia is associated with a lower willingness to fight for Estonia.

Socioeconomic factors (Model SD) has a slightly larger explanatory power (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.18). As expected, speaking Estonian at home is a large and statistically significant predictor of support for resistance to foreign invasion as are older age, being male and higher personal income of respondents.

Political attitudes (Model PA) explain the variance in the willingness to fight for Estonia considerably better (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.442). The perceptions that Estonia has a reliable military and ethnic minorities are treated well in Estonia have positive and statistically significant association with the attitude towards resistance.

The explanatory power of the combined model joining together variables in all three previous models increases marginally (adjusted R-squared 0.453). However, some variables become statistically less significant but listening to Estonian radio broadcasts, being male, having confidence in the Estonian military, appreciating the treatment of ethnic minorities and Estonia itself remain the most important predictors.

NATO will not protect Estonia

Model MC (media consumption) demonstrates a small explanatory power – adjusted R-squared stands at 0.105. Those who are more pessimistic about the resolve of NATO to protect Estonia more often watch Estonian and Russian TV broadcasts (with the exception of ETV+) and get news from portals in Estonian. Those who read news on Russian-language portals, however, tend to believe that NATO will actually protect Estonia against a military invasion.

Socioeconomic factors (Model SD) has an even smaller explanatory power (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.084). Male respondents hold greater trust about NATO's assistance while older people and respondents speaking Estonian at home tend to be more skeptical about NATO's assistance.

Political attitudes (Model PA) explain the variance in attitudes towards NATO protective role about as well as the previous two models (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.093). The perceptions that Estonia has a reliable military, Estonia is better than many countries, and the Estonian government is making good use of taxpayers' money have a positive and statistically significant association with the believing in protection by NATO.

The explanatory power of the combined model joining together variables in all three previous models increases marginally (adjusted R-squared 0.162). Intriguingly, several variables of media consumption retain their statistical significance but virtually all demographic and attitudinal variables lose their statistical significance except for the confidence in the armed forces of Estonia.

NATO military presence improves Estonia's security

Model MC (media consumption) demonstrates a reasonable explanatory power – adjusted R-squared stands at 0.327. The direction of association with independent variables is largely in line with the expectations. Heavier consumers of Russian-language media tend to side with the Russian propaganda idea of NATO undermining the Estonian

security while heavier users of Estonian-language media hold an opposite view. Statistically significant at .05 level are factors such as Estonian TV and Estonian radio broadcasts, portals in Estonian, on the one hand, and Russian TV and Russian radio broadcasts, on the other.

Socioeconomic factors (Model SD) has a smaller explanatory power (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.278). As expected, being male, speaking Estonian at home and earning higher personal income are statistically significant predictors of seeing NATO as a factor that improves Estonia's security.

Political attitudes (Model PA) explain the variance in the perception of NATO considerably better (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.602). The perceptions that Estonia has a reliable military, ethnic minorities are treated well in Estonia, and things in Estonia are developing in the right direction have positive and statistically significant association with seeing NATO as a positive contribution to Estonia's security. On the contrary, respondents who believe that life in the Soviet times was better are significantly less inclined to believe in NATO as a factor increasing Estonia's security.

The explanatory power of the combined model joining together variables in all three previous models remains virtually constant (adjusted R-squared 0.601). However, some variables become statistically insignificant but listening to Russia radio broadcasts and watching Russian TV retain their skeptical impact while all four attitudinal variables remain significant.

Fascism is on the rise in Estonia

Model MC (media consumption) demonstrates a modest explanatory power – adjusted R-squared stands at 0.226. The direction of association with independent variables is largely in line with the expectations. Heavier consumers of Russian-language media tend to side with the Russian propaganda idea of rising fascism in Estonia while heavier users of Estonian-language media hold an opposite view. Statistically significant at .05 level are factors such as consumption of Estonian radio and TV on the one hand, and Russian radio, TV and portals, on the other. Interestingly, users of Estonian-language portals also tend to support the perception of rising fascism in Estonia.

Socioeconomic factors (Model SD) has a smaller explanatory power (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.160). As expected, being female, being of younger age, and speaking at home language other than Estonian are statistically significant predictors of perceiving a rise of fascism in Estonia.

Political attitudes (Model PA) explain the variance in the attitudes about fascism in Estonia better (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.331). The positive perceptions about the Soviet regime in Estonia along with social conservative views have positive and statistically significant association with seeing fascism on the rise. Curiously, the same association is with the view that the government makes good use of taxpayers' money. Those who appreciate the existing treatment of ethnic minorities and who have a strong confidence in Estonia's armed forces hold an opposite view.

The explanatory power of the combined model joining together variables in all three

previous models improves only marginally (adjusted R-squared 0.372). However, some variables become statistically insignificant but watching Russian TV retains its importance.

Europe is in moral decay

Model MC (media consumption) demonstrates a small explanatory power – adjusted R-squared stands at 0.144. The direction of association with independent variables is largely in line with the expectations. Of statistically significant associations, heavier usage of communication applications in Russian and watching Russian TV contribute to siding with the idea of Europe's moral decay. However, the use of social media in Russian is associated with the opposite view.

Socioeconomic factors (Model SD) has a nearly identical explanatory power (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.139). As expected, being of older age, speaking at home language other than Estonian, having a lower level of formal education and lower household income are statistically significant predictors of seeing Europe in the state of moral decay.

Political attitudes (Model PA) explain the variance in the perception of NATO considerably better (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.518). The perceptions that Estonia has a reliable military, the government makes a good use of taxpayers' money, and things in Estonia are developing in the right direction have a negative and statistically significant association with the claim about Europe's moral decay. On the other hand, respondents who believe that life in the Soviet times was better are significantly more inclined to believe in the moral decay thesis.

The explanatory power of the combined model joining together variables in all three previous models remains nearly unchanged (adjusted R-squared 0.507). However, some variables become statistically insignificant but the level of education and all above attitudinal factors retain their significance.

Ukraine is an anti-Russian project

Model MC (media consumption) demonstrates a modest explanatory power – adjusted R-squared stands at 0.206. The direction of association with independent variables is largely in line with the expectations. Consumers of Russian TV and Russian radio tend to believe in this message while consumers of Estonian radio and Estonian portals tend to dismiss it.

Socioeconomic factors (Model SD) has a nearly identical explanatory power (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.210). Being a female and being of older age is positively associated with support to the message about Ukraine's anti-Russian nature while speaking Estonian at home, having a higher level of formal education and higher personal income discourages such support.

Political attitudes (Model PA) explain the variance in the attitudes towards Ukraine (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.416). The only perception that is positively associated with the anti-Russian nature of Ukraine is the belief that life under the Soviet regime was better.

The explanatory power of the combined model joining together variables in all three

previous models improves only marginally (adjusted R-squared 0.447). However, some variables become statistically insignificant but it is all the above demographic factors that retain their significance along with the perception of the Soviet regime.

Country summary

Although nearly a quarter of Estonia's population identify as ethnic Russians and a clear majority of the country's population have a very good command of Russian language, ideas of the Russian propaganda have made modest inroads to the Estonia's society.

There is a strong sense that Estonia should resist a foreign invasion (73% of adults support this idea). However, the willingness to fight for Estonia in an armed manner is notably lower (42%), which may be related to a reliance on NATO. Two thirds of the population reject the Russian claim that NATO will not protect Estonia in the case of military invasion. Moreover, about 70 per cent of the population believe that NATO military presence in Estonia improves the country's security situation.

There is some traction for the idea that fascism is on the rise in Estonia (16%). Similarly, one in five Estonians (22%) regard Ukraine as an anti-Russian project supported by the West in order to destabilize Russia. However, a third of the population (36%) believe Europe to be in a state of moral decay.

This study was based on an assumption that media consumption is a major factor affecting one's attitudes towards Russian propaganda messages – the more intensive the consumption of Russian media, the more sympathetic is the attitude towards the messages. However, media consumption patterns have a moderate explanatory power as they, based on the linear regression analysis, account for a variance between 10 and 32 per cent. The largest media consumption effect is seen on the issue of NATO military presence improving Estonia's security.

Sociodemographic factors were used as another set of potentially relevant variables. The analysis shows that the demographic factors included in regression models had smaller influence and explained between eight and 27 per cent of variance.


It was a range of attitudinal factors that held the greatest explanatory power ranging from nine per cent on the issue of NATO protection of Estonia in the case of military invasion to 60 per cent on the issue of NATO military presence being a positive contribution to Estonia's security. Among these variables, respondents' confidence in the Estonian armed forces was a statistically significant factor for attitudes towards all the Russian messages included in this study. Further, the perception of an equal treatment of ethnic minorities and of the life under the Soviet regime were among the most frequent statistically significant factors.

Lithuania

Consumption of traditional media in Lithuania

One in four Lithuania’s residents reads print media in Lithuanian on a daily basis (see Graph 28), which is above the European average of 20 per cent.


Graph 28.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

However, the circulation of print media in Russian is tiny as only one per cent of respondents indicated they read this kind of print media on a daily basis (see Graph 29).


Graph 29.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

Watching television is a considerably more popular activity as more than half of Lithuania's adult population watch TV broadcasts in Lithuanian on a daily or nearly daily basis (see Graph 30). Another 11 per cent watch TV in Lithuanian every other day.


Graph 30.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

Watching TV in Russian is not a popular pastime in Lithuania – only two per cent of respondents do so on a daily basis and another two per cent watch Russian TV broadcasts every other day (see Graph 31).


Graph 31.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

Listening to radio broadcasts in Lithuanian is somewhat less popular as watching TV broadcasts in Lithuanian – two in five people entertain radio broadcasts on a daily or nearly daily basis (see Graph 32). Another 16 per cent do it every other day.


Graph 32.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

Radio broadcasts in Russian are not popular in Lithuania. Only one per cent of respondents said they listen to radio in Russian on a daily basis and another two per cent do so every other day (see Graph 33).

Graph 33.




Base: all respondents, N=1500

News consumption of digital media in Lithuania

The rapid development of information and communication technologies (ICT) has enabled an explosive growth of digital media that have swiftly become a dominant channel of information including news and current events. This trend is clearly visible in Lithuania where nearly two thirds of adult population on a daily basis acquire information about current events from internet portals in Lithuanian (see Graph 34).


Graph 34.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

Portals in Russian serve only a small fraction of Lithuania’s society as a source of information about current events – three per cent of respondents check portals in Russian for news on a daily basis.


Graph 35.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

Lithuanian residents are quite active in using social media to acquire news and information about current events as two in five respondents do so in Estonian on a daily basis (see Graph 36), which is comparable to the activity in the Anglo-Saxon countries.

Graph 36.




Base: all respondents, N=1500

Those who use social media in Lithuanian to follow news more frequently are 18-50 year olds, women, low-income respondents.

Social media in Russian also are a very important source of information about current events as 13 per cent of respondents follow the news on those social media on a daily basis.

Graph 37.




Base: all respondents, N=1500

Those who use social media in Russian to follow news more frequently are 50-74 year olds, women, people who speak Russian at home, low-income respondents, persons with vocational secondary education.

Various communication applications (Telegram, WhatsApp etc.) constitute an even more recent way of acquiring information about current local and global events. Nearly two fifths of respondents indicated they used communication apps in Lithuanian to follow the news (see Graph 38).

Graph 38.




Base: all respondents, N=1500

Those who use communication apps to follow news in Lithuanian more frequently are 30-39 year olds, women, people who speak Lithuanian at home, respondents with low-to-medium personal income.

One in fifteen residents uses communication apps to follow current events in Russian on a daily or nearly daily basis (Graph 39). Those who use communication apps to follow news in Russian more frequently are 40-59 year olds, male, people who speak Russian at home, persons with low personal income and with vocational secondary education.

Graph 39.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

Responsiveness to Russian propaganda


Russia has been keen to maintain certain influence over countries that used to be parts of the Soviet Union. It coined the concept of 'near abroad' to provide an ideological justification and a geopolitical strategy employed by Russia to describe its relationship with the fourteen independent states that (re)emerged following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russia regards these states as part of its historical sphere of influence due to history and select cultural aspects. Importantly, many of these countries have significant Russian-speaking populations and cultural connections to Russia.

It is important to note that Russia seeks to exert its political influence over these countries to ensure friendly governments that align with its foreign policy goals. This influence is achieved through various means, including diplomatic pressure, economic incentives, and support for pro-Russian political movements.

One of the ways to maintain its influence is to sway the mood of the general public Russia's way by means of relentless propaganda. The Baltic countries that swiftly defined their pro-Western political orientation and made tremendous and successful efforts to join a range of international arrangements including the European Union and NATO became targets of the Russian propaganda efforts. While the concept of the near abroad was elevated to a new level after the 2008 war in Georgia and the start of the Russian invasion to Ukraine in 2014, the societies of the Baltic countries received a fairly constant set of Russian messages communicated in various ways. These messages focused on the indecisiveness of the West should a military conflict between Russia and NATO break out, on the weak performance of Baltic governments and their inability to provide public goods, and on weakening of the will of the Balts to fight in the case of a military conflict.

One of the ideas promoted by the Russian propaganda is that Lithuania is a relatively small country and should a conflict with Russia arise, a military resistance would bear no fruit and would greatly harm Lithuania's population. However, more than a third half of Lithuania's adult population firmly believe that a resistance to a foreign invasion does make sense and another quarter gravitate towards this belief (see Graph 40).


Graph 40.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

While there is a strong belief among Lithuania’s population that a foreign invasion needs to be resisted, the actual willingness to defend the country in an armed manner is much less pronounced as only one in seven respondents say they are willing to fight for Lithuania (see Graph 41).


Graph 41.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

The indecisiveness of Western powers during the war in Ukraine adds arguments for a long-standing Russian message that NATO will not protect Lithuania in the event of military invasion. However, Lithuanians hold a relatively strong belief in NATO allies as only seven per cent think NATO will not protect Lithuania in the case of military invasion and another 15 per cent gravitate towards supporting it (see Graph 42).


Graph 42.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

Moreover, more than two fifths of Lithuania's population clearly believe that NATO's military presence in Lithuania strengthens the country's security (see Graph 43).


Graph 43.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

Russia has often cast itself as a moral stronghold vis-à-vis what it defines as a moral decay of the Western civilization. This idea has some traction in Lithuania as 12 per cent of the country's residents fully agree with the decay thesis and another quarter tends to agree with it (see Graph 44).


Graph 44.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

One of the alternatives advocated by the Russian propaganda is the Soviet past that is presumed to be free of the ills of a capitalist society. However, only six per cent of Lithuania's population believe that life under the Soviet regime was better than in the contemporary Lithuania (see Graph 45).


Graph 45.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

Russia makes frequent references to its role in World War II and in defeating fascism that came at a high price. Therefore, Russia reacts impatiently to what it sees as a return of anything fascist and uses the reproach of a re-emergence of fascism as an indication of serious criticism of countries in what Russia sees as its sphere of influence. Despite not infrequent complaints about Lithuania, only three percent of the country's adult residents fully agree with the assessment that fascism is on the rise in Lithuania (see Graph 46) and another four per cent tend to agree with this assessment. Equally important is the fact that 10 per cent of respondents found it impossible to define their attitude towards the idea of rising fascism in Lithuania.


Graph 46.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

A relatively recent idea that is floated by Russia is that Ukraine as a country is an anti-Russian project generously supported by the West with the aim of destabilizing or even destroying Russia. It appears that this idea is used to justify a further invasion in Ukraine and the huge costs that this invasion involves. However, this idea has a somewhat limited support among Lithuania's population (seven per cent fully agree and another 12 per cent rather agree with such a statement) (see Graph 47).

Graph 47.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

Russia’s influence in the world

As the war in Ukraine continues, Russia faces various challenges. On the one hand, it needs to mobilize resources for military purposes under the circumstances of economic sanctions introduced by a group of industrially advanced countries. This limits the ability to extract profits from Russian exports of natural resources and makes Russia to accept contracts on presumably unfavorable terms weakening the country also in a longer run. On the other hand, the limited economic activity on a par with less than efficient military raises questions about Russia’s ability to achieve its political goals. Also, the Russian mode of waging the war in Ukraine has prompted some to reevaluate the greatness of Russian culture.

It is against this background that the perception of Russia in Lithuania was studied. First, questions about the current influence of Russia in global economy, world politics, and global culture and science were posed to respondents. On a scale from 0 to 10, respondents yielded an arguably modest evaluation of 5.0 points for Russia’s economic influence in the world (see Graph 48).

Graph 48.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

Russia’s current influence in world politics is rated slightly higher than that in the global economy as the mean global political influence stands at 5.4 points (see Graph 49).


Graph 49.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

Russia’s global cultural influence has received an average evaluation of 4.0 points (see Graph 50).

Graph 50.




Base: all respondents, N=1500

In an effort to tap into the dynamics of assessments of Russia’s influence, respondents were asked to indicate how the global role of Russia had changed over the last three years (with a view on the intensification of war in Ukraine in 2022).

One in ten respondents noted a varying increase of Russia’s influence in the global economy (see Graph 51). On the other hand, two thirds of respondents believe Russia’s economic influence has actually diminished.


Graph 51.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

When it comes to Russia’s political significance on the global stage, one in six respondents see it rising (see Graph 52) while three fifths of respondents believe this influence diminished.


Graph 52.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

Perhaps the most serious blow was dealt to Russia’s global cultural influence as an absolute majority of Lithuania’s population believe that this influence has decreased over the last three years (see Graph 53) and a tiny fraction of five per cent noted an increase.

Graph 53.



Base: all respondents, N=1500

Factors related to the influence of Russia's propaganda

Survey data show that public support to Russian propaganda messages varies as does perception of Russia's role in the contemporary world. On the one hand, more than 40 per cent of residents of Lithuania believe that Europe is in moral decay. On the other, only seven per cent have noticed that fascism is on the rise in Lithuania. This variation is noteworthy and calls for an explanation. Therefore, this study employs three groups of factors that previous research has associated with persuasive communication.

Given that about five per cent of Lithuania's population identify as Russians and about 60 per cent of Lithuanian population speak Russian, there is a potentially large audience for the Russian media that arguably aim to influence popular views in Lithuania. Therefore, it is assumed that a more intensive consumption of Russian-language media will be associated with attitudes that are closer to Russian propaganda messages.

There is a substantial body of research demonstrating the role of sociodemographic characteristics in media consumption and in the reception of media contents. For example, people with higher income are more likely to consume paid contents and people with higher levels of formal education are more likely to consume sophisticated media contents. Based on this body of research, it is hypothesized that people who use Russian language at home are more likely to be sympathetic towards the messages of the Russian propaganda.

Popular attitudes towards political issues are conditioned by people's perception of government performance and political values. For example, it is demonstrated that socially conservative attitudes towards issues like prostitution, abortion or euthanasia are related to the willingness to fight for one's country. Also, a positive perception of how the government of a country functions in providing various public goods has been shown to be related to a rejection of extremist views. In view of these findings, it is assumed that a negative evaluation of the Lithuanian government performance will be associated with a greater openness towards the Russian propaganda.

In order to scrutinize the significance of the above factors, four models of linear regression are developed. The first model (abbreviated as SD) contains social demographic factors only – age, gender, language spoken at home, income, and level of formal education. A next model (abbreviated as MC) focuses on media consumption and factors in the frequency of use of both traditional and digital media. Another model (abbreviated as PA) includes popular attitudes towards a range of political issues – government performance evaluation, treatment of ethnic minorities, perceptions of life under the Soviet

regime, confidence in Lithuania's military, and a cumulative index of conservative attitudes. And a final model integrates all the variables from the three models.

Quantitative results of the regression analysis in the form of standardized Beta coefficients are provided in the appendix of this report.

It makes sense to resist foreign invasion

Model MC (media consumption) demonstrates a small explanatory power – adjusted R-squared stands at 0.062. The direction of association with independent variables is largely in line with the expectations. Heavier consumers of Russian-language media tend to side with the Russian propaganda idea of NATO undermining the Lithuania's security while heavier users of Lithuanian-language media hold an opposite view. Statistically significant at .05 level are factors such as Russian TV and Russian radio broadcasts, portals in Russian.

Socioeconomic factors (Model SD) has an even smaller explanatory power (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.052). As expected, being male, speaking Lithuanian at home, being of older age and earning higher personal income are statistically significant predictors of support to resistance against a foreign invasion.

Political attitudes (Model PA) explain the variance in the support to resistance considerably better (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.333). The perceptions that Lithuania has a reliable military, ethnic minorities are treated well in Lithuania, and things in Lithuania are developing in the right direction have positive and statistically significant association with support for resistance to a foreign invasion. On the contrary, respondents who believe that life in the Soviet times was better are significantly less inclined to support the idea of resistance.

The explanatory power of the combined model joining together variables in all three previous models increases a tiny bit (adjusted R-squared 0.362). However, only attitudinal and demographic variables retain statistical significance.

I am willing to fight for Lithuania

Model MC (media consumption) demonstrates a small explanatory power – adjusted R-squared stands at 0.087. The direction of association with independent variables is largely in line with the expectations. Heavier consumers of Russian-language media tend to withhold support for fighting for Lithuania while heavier users of Lithuanian-language media hold an opposite view. Statistically significant at .05 level are factors such as Russian TV and Russian radio broadcasts, on the one hand, and print media, TV and radio broadcasts in Lithuanian.

Socioeconomic factors (Model SD) has the same explanatory power (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.086). As expected, being male, speaking Lithuanian at home, and earning higher personal income are statistically significant predictors of willingness to fight for Lithuania.

Political attitudes (Model PA) explain the variance in the willingness to fight for Lithuania considerably better (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.308). The perceptions that Lithuania has a reliable military, ethnic minorities are treated well in Lithuania, the government makes good use of taxpayers' money, and things in Lithuania are developing in the right direction have positive and statistically significant association with the willingness to fight for Lithuania. On the contrary, respondents who believe that life in the Soviet times was better are significantly less inclined to support the idea of resistance.

The explanatory power of the combined model joining together variables in all three previous models increases somewhat (adjusted R-squared 0.389). Only select media consumption variables lose statistical significance: consumption of print media and TV in Lithuanian.

NATO will not protect Lithuania

Model MC (media consumption) demonstrates a small explanatory power – adjusted R-squared stands at 0.104. The direction of association with independent variables is largely in line with the expectations. Heavier consumers of Russian-language media tend to side with the Russian propaganda idea of NATO failing to protect Lithuania while heavier users of Lithuanian-language media hold an opposite view. Statistically significant at .05 level are factors such as Russian TV and Russian radio broadcasts, portals and social media in Russian.

Socioeconomic factors (Model SD) has an even smaller explanatory power (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.072). As expected, being female, speaking language other than Lithuanian at home, and earning lower personal income are statistically significant predictors of pessimism about NATO's protective function.

Political attitudes (Model PA) explain the variance in the support to resistance substantially better (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.424). The perceptions that Lithuania has a reliable military, the government making good use of taxpayers' money, and things in Lithuania are developing in the right direction have negative and statistically significant association with pessimism about NATO. On the contrary, respondents who believe that life in the Soviet times was better are significantly skeptical about NATO providing protection to Lithuania in a case of military invasion.

The explanatory power of the combined model joining together variables in all three previous models decreases a tiny bit (adjusted R-squared 0.416). Only attitudinal and demographic variables retain statistical significance while the importance of some media variables diminishes.

NATO military presence improves Lithuania's security

Model MC (media consumption) demonstrates a small explanatory power – adjusted R-squared stands at 0.177. The direction of association with independent variables is in line with the expectations. Heavier consumers of Russian-language media tend to withhold support for fighting for Lithuania while heavier users of Lithuanian-

language media hold an opposite view. The only factors that are not statistically significant at .05 level are Russian print media, social media in Lithuanian, and communication apps in both languages.

Socioeconomic factors (Model SD) has an even smaller explanatory power (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.107). As expected, being male, speaking Lithuanian at home, and earning higher personal income are statistically significant predictors of seeing NATO military presence in Lithuania as a positive contribution to the country's security.

Political attitudes (Model PA) explain the variance in the attitudes towards NATO military presence in Lithuania considerably better (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.527). All variables included in the regression analysis except for the government use of taxpayers' money yield statistically significant results in the expected direction. Those who appreciate the Soviet times do not see the positive role of NATO military presence. Those who believe that Lithuania has a reliable military, treats ethnic minorities well, the country develops in the right direction and those who hold socially liberal views appreciate the military presence of NATO in Lithuania.

The explanatory power of the combined model joining together variables in all three previous models increases by a bit (adjusted R-squared 0.557). All demographic variables and most attitudinal variables mentioned above (except for minority interests taken into account) retain statistical significance but media consumption performs less convincingly as only Russian TV and Lithuanian radio variables are statistically significant here.

Fascism is on the rise in Lithuania

Model MC (media consumption) demonstrates a small explanatory power – adjusted R-squared stands at 0.117. The direction of association with independent variables is in line with the expectations. Heavier consumers of Russian-language media tend to see fascism rising in Lithuania while heavier users of Lithuanian-language media tend to hold an opposite view. The factors that are statistically significant at .05 level are Lithuanian print media and portals in Lithuanian for the latter group and Russian TV, Russian radio, Russian portals and communication apps in Lithuanian for the former group.

Socioeconomic factors (Model SD) have an even smaller explanatory power (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.094). Being female is positively associated with seeing a rise of fascism in Lithuania while being of younger age, speaking Lithuanian at home, having a higher level of education and income are negatively associated with noticing fascist resurgence in the country.

Political attitudes (Model PA) explain the variance in the attitudes towards the dynamics of fascism in Lithuania considerably better (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.369). All variables included in the regression analysis except for the government use of taxpayers' money yield statistically significant results in the expected direction. Those who appreciate the Soviet times clearly see a rise of fascism. Those who believe that Lithuania has a reliable military, treats ethnic minorities well, the country develops in the right direction dismiss the rise of fascism in Lithuania.

The explanatory power of the combined model joining together variables in all three

previous models increases by a bit (adjusted R-squared 0.380). All demographic variables but age lose their statistical significance. Of media variables, only listening to Russia radio and reading portals in Russian remain statistically significant. Among attitudinal variables, the assessment of the Soviet times remains a strong predictor of seeing fascism in Lithuania while the treatment of minorities and feeling that Lithuania develops in the right direction have a negative association with noting the rise of fascism.

Europe is in moral decay

Model MC (media consumption) demonstrates a very small explanatory power – adjusted R-squared stands at 0.042. The direction of association with independent variables is in line with the expectations. Heavier consumers of Russian-language media tend to see Europe’s moral decay while heavier users of Lithuanian-language media tend to hold an opposite view. The factors that are statistically significant at .05 level are Lithuanian TV for the latter group and Russian TV, portals and social media in Russian for the former group.

Socioeconomic factors (Model SD) have a virtually identical explanatory power (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.034). Older age is positively associated with seeing Europe’s moral decay while smaller household income are negatively associated with noticing the decay.

Political attitudes (Model PA) explain the variance in the attitudes about Europe’s moral decay better (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.232). Those who view the Soviet times more positively and those who believe that Lithuania is better than many other countries tend to discern Europe’s decay. Those who believe that Lithuania develops in the right direction and that the government makes good use of taxpayers’ money dismiss the idea of Europe’s moral decay.

The explanatory power of the combined model joining together variables in all three previous models stays virtually unchanged (adjusted R-squared 0.235). All media variables lose their statistical significance but all attitudinal variables retain their significance. Among the demographic variables, only age remains relevant.

Ukraine is an anti-Russian project

Model MC (media consumption) demonstrates a small explanatory power – adjusted R-squared stands at 0.096. People who frequently watch Lithuanian or Russian television, listen to radio broadcasts in Russian, obtain news from social media in Russian tend to side with the assessment of Ukraine as an anti-Russian project.

Socioeconomic factors (Model SD) have an even smaller explanatory power (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.073). Being female and of older age is positively associated with seeing Ukraine as an anti-Russian project. Speaking Lithuanian at home, having a higher level of education and higher personal income are negatively associated with the anti-Russian nature of Ukraine.

Political attitudes (Model PA) explain the variance in the attitudes towards Ukraine in Lithuania somewhat better (adjusted R-squared stands at 0.200). Those who appreciate the Soviet times clearly view Ukraine as an anti-Russian project supported by the West. Those who believe the government makes good use of taxpayers' money and hold socially liberal views tend to reject the anti-Russian nature of the contemporary Ukraine.

The explanatory power of the combined model joining together variables in all three previous models increases by a bit (adjusted R-squared 0.238). All attitudinal variables but the assessment of the Soviet regime lose their statistical significance. Of the demographic variables, only gender remains statistically significant. Among the media variables, watching TV in both languages and following news on social media in Russian remain statistically significant.

Country summary

Although a majority of Lithuania's population have an adequate command of Russian language, ideas of the Russian propaganda have made modest inroads to the Lithuania's society.

There is a strong sense that Lithuania should resist a foreign invasion (63% of adults support this idea). However, the willingness to fight for Lithuania in an armed manner is notably lower (38%), which may be related to a reliance on NATO. About half of the population reject the Russian claim that NATO will not protect Lithuania in the case of military invasion. Moreover, three quarters of the population believe that NATO military presence in Lithuania improves the country's security situation.

There is barely any traction for the idea that fascism is on the rise in Lithuania (7%). Similarly, one in five Lithuanians (19%) regard Ukraine as an anti-Russian project supported by the West in order to destabilize Russia. However, two fifths of the population (40%) believe Europe to be in a state of moral decay.

This study was based on an assumption that media consumption is a major factor affecting one's attitudes towards Russian propaganda messages – the more intensive the consumption of Russian media, the more sympathetic is the attitude towards the messages. However, media consumption patterns hold a relatively small explanatory power as they, based on the linear regression analysis, account for a variance between four and 17 per cent. The largest media consumption effect is seen on the issue of NATO military presence improving Lithuania's security.

Sociodemographic factors were used as another set of potentially relevant variables. The analysis shows that the demographic factors included in regression models had smaller influence and explained between three and ten per cent of variance.

It was a range of attitudinal factors that held the greatest explanatory power ranging from 20 per cent on the issue of Ukraine being a Western-funded anti-Russian project to 52 per cent on the issue of NATO military presence being a positive contribution to Lithuania's security. Among these variables, the attitude towards life under the Soviet regime played a notably important role. Further, the perception of the reliability of the Lithuanian armed forces was of high importance on the issues of security (willingness to fight, resistance to invasion etc.). Moreover, attitudes towards the government performance and the treatment of ethnic minorities play important roles in the responsiveness to the messages of the Russian propaganda.

Appendices

Notes:

1. Appendices are grouped in accordance with countries.
2. Appendix title including abbreviation EE denominates Estonia (f.ex. Appendix EE_A).
3. Appendix title including abbreviation LT denominates Lithuania (f.ex. Appendix LT_A).

Appendix EE_A. It makes sense to resist a foreign invasion

	Combined model		Model MC		Model SD		Model PA	
	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.
Printed media in Estonian	0.037	0.348	0.026	0.437				
Printed media in Russian	-0.03	0.442	-0.047	0.167				
TV in Estonian	0.013	0.796	0.121	0.005				
ETV+	0.001	0.986	0.02	0.542				
TV broadcasts from Russia	0.016	0.68	-0.123	<.001				
Radio in Estonian	-0.02	0.649	0.051	0.196				
Radio in Russian	-0.125	0.007	-0.171	<.001				
Portals in Estonian	0.031	0.491	0.176	<.001				
Portals in Russian	0.048	0.425	0.012	0.815				
Social media in Estonian	-0.008	0.836	-0.047	0.181				
Social media in Russian	-0.058	0.329	-0.039	0.423				
Communication apps in Estonian	-0.011	0.768	-0.041	0.224				
Communication apps in Russian	-0.008	0.866	-0.046	0.26				
Female	0.003	0.926			-0.041	0.176		
Age	0.041	0.278			0.087	0.005		
Estonian language at home	0.109	0.077			0.434	<.001		
Education	-0.033	0.313			0.005	0.881		
Personal income	0.054	0.186			0.105	0.006		
Household income	0.015	0.694			0.029	0.416		
Life in Soviet times better	-0.118	0.002					-0.155	<.001
Good use of taxpayers' money	-0.026	0.583					-0.012	0.766
Ethnic minorities have the same opportunities	0.03	0.485					0.1	0.008
Things in the right direction	0.073	0.14					0.047	0.271
Interests of ethnic minorities taken into account	0.071	0.121					0.123	0.002
Estonia better than many other countries	0.114	0.005					0.133	<.001
Strong confidence in EE armed forces	0.224	<.001					0.299	<.001
Social liberalism index	0.072	0.039					0.028	0.306
Adjusted R-sq.	0.404		0.258		0.224		0.400	

Appendix EE_B. I am willing to fight for Estonia

	Combined model		Model MC		Model SD		Model PA	
	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.
Printed media in Estonian	-0.025	0.52	0.026	0.477				
Printed media in Russian	0.022	0.568	-0.015	0.691				
TV in Estonian	0.004	0.932	0.096	0.045				
ETV+	0.026	0.503	0.1	0.006				
TV broadcasts from Russia	-0.037	0.324	-0.18	<.001				
Radio in Estonian	0.12	0.006	0.218	<.001				
Radio in Russian	-0.06	0.178	-0.093	0.025				
Portals in Estonian	-0.053	0.227	0.101	0.014				
Portals in Russian	0.006	0.912	-0.009	0.866				
Social media in Estonian	0.014	0.716	-0.109	0.005				
Social media in Russian	0.095	0.089	0.047	0.372				
Communication apps in Estonian	-0.023	0.534	-0.027	0.456				
Communication apps in Russian	0.032	0.489	0.032	0.459				
Female	-0.2	<.001			-0.202	<.001		
Age	0.062	0.093			0.192	<.001		
Estonian language at home	0.007	0.913			0.274	<.001		
Education	-0.011	0.732			0.001	0.979		
Personal income	0.037	0.35			0.103	0.011		
Household income	-0.003	0.942			0.03	0.431		
Life in Soviet times better	-0.026	0.493					-0.015	0.653
Good use of taxpayers' money	0.003	0.944					-0.014	0.737
Ethnic minorities have the same opportunities	0.098	0.022					0.144	<.001
Things in the right direction	0.04	0.419					0.003	0.938
Interests of ethnic minorities taken into account	0.082	0.073					0.122	0.002
Estonia better than many other countries	0.12	0.003					0.062	0.071
Strong confidence in EE armed forces	0.401	<.001					0.475	<.001
Social liberalism index	-0.031	0.358					0.002	0.932
Adjusted R-sq.	0.453		0.166		0.180		0.442	

Appendix EE_C. NATO will not protect Estonia

	Combined model		Model MC		Model SD		Model PA	
	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.
Printed media in Estonian	-0.008	0.865	0.033	0.378				
Printed media in Russian	0.023	0.622	-0.052	0.166				
TV in Estonian	0.022	0.713	0.107	0.027				
ETV+	-0.119	0.013	-0.107	0.004				
TV broadcasts from Russia	0.127	0.006	0.088	0.016				
Radio in Estonian	0.053	0.329	0.061	0.164				
Radio in Russian	0.076	0.16	0.068	0.106				
Portals in Estonian	0.101	0.056	0.122	0.003				
Portals in Russian	-0.251	<.001	-0.141	0.011				
Social media in Estonian	-0.063	0.189	-0.045	0.255				
Social media in Russian	-0.037	0.591	-0.074	0.168				
Communication apps in Estonian	0.034	0.462	-0.026	0.475				
Communication apps in Russian	0.086	0.128	0.088	0.052				
Female	-0.07	0.091			-0.076	0.02		
Age	0.057	0.209			0.067	0.043		
Estonian language at home	0.071	0.331			0.254	<.001		
Education	0.049	0.212			0.046	0.181		
Personal income	-0.007	0.882			0.066	0.111		
Household income	0.016	0.72			0.016	0.678		
Life in Soviet times better	0.029	0.536					-0.008	0.838
Good use of taxpayers' money	0.086	0.13					0.11	0.031
Ethnic minorities have the same opportunities	-0.052	0.31					0.037	0.427
Things in the right direction	-0.02	0.733					-0.099	0.063
Interests of ethnic minorities taken into account	-0.047	0.393					-0.024	0.617
Estonia better than many other countries	0.06	0.208					0.122	0.005
Strong confidence in EE armed forces	0.163	0.002					0.214	<.001
Social liberalism index	-0.021	0.602					-0.022	0.514
Adjusted R-sq.	0.162		0.105		0.084		0.093	

Appendix EE_D. NATO military presence improves Estonia's security

	Combined model		Model MC		Model SD		Model PA	
	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.
Printed media in Estonian	0.052	0.103	0.059	0.065				
Printed media in Russian	-0.018	0.559	-0.039	0.222				
TV in Estonian	0.005	0.906	0.113	0.006				
ETV+	0.013	0.683	0.041	0.188				
TV broadcasts from Russia	-0.093	0.004	-0.268	<.001				
Radio in Estonian	0.031	0.398	0.108	0.004				
Radio in Russian	-0.074	0.046	-0.129	<.001				
Portals in Estonian	0.011	0.756	0.153	<.001				
Portals in Russian	0.06	0.216	-0.024	0.61				
Social media in Estonian	-0.01	0.749	-0.036	0.278				
Social media in Russian	0.034	0.476	0.055	0.227				
Communication apps in Estonian	0.003	0.923	-0.034	0.288				
Communication apps in Russian	0.007	0.85	-0.052	0.171				
Female	-0.054	0.057			-0.064	0.026		
Age	-0.043	0.161			0.024	0.402		
Estonian language at home	0.122	0.015			0.465	<.001		
Education	-0.01	0.722			0.042	0.162		
Personal income	0.006	0.848			0.117	0.001		
Household income	0.03	0.339			0.067	0.052		
Life in Soviet times better	-0.231	<.001					-0.285	<.001
Good use of taxpayers' money	-0.021	0.583					0.03	0.37
Ethnic minorities have the same opportunities	0.114	0.001					0.182	<.001
Things in the right direction	0.151	<.001					0.102	0.003
Interests of ethnic minorities taken into account	-0.046	0.229					0.025	0.431
Estonia better than many other countries	0.023	0.484					0.034	0.219
Strong confidence in EE armed forces	0.35	<.001					0.355	<.001
Social liberalism index	0.041	0.148					0.041	0.068
Adjusted R-sq.	0.601		0.327		0.278		0.602	

Appendix EE_E. Europe is in moral decay

	Combined model		Model MC		Model SD		Model PA	
	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.
Printed media in Estonian	-0.028	0.438	-0.05	0.172				
Printed media in Russian	0.013	0.705	-0.01	0.778				
TV in Estonian	0.057	0.212	-0.069	0.145				
ETV+	0.063	0.084	0.03	0.402				
TV broadcasts from Russia	0.049	0.169	0.22	<.001				
Radio in Estonian	-0.025	0.537	-0.08	0.061				
Radio in Russian	0.05	0.225	0.055	0.174				
Portals in Estonian	0.022	0.592	-0.024	0.561				
Portals in Russian	-0.064	0.238	0.027	0.607				
Social media in Estonian	-0.017	0.63	-0.001	0.989				
Social media in Russian	-0.063	0.234	-0.106	0.042				
Communication apps in Estonian	-0.036	0.297	-0.002	0.96				
Communication apps in Russian	0.079	0.068	0.121	0.005				
Female	0.007	0.813			-0.049	0.12		
Age	0.046	0.18			0.089	0.007		
Estonian language at home	-0.005	0.922			-0.294	<.001		
Education	-0.09	0.003			-0.152	<.001		
Personal income	0.047	0.21			-0.035	0.391		
Household income	-0.029	0.399			-0.077	0.044		
Life in Soviet times better	0.117	0.001					0.15	<.001
Good use of taxpayers' money	-0.197	<.001					-0.232	<.001
Ethnic minorities have the same opportunities	0.081	0.039					0.086	0.012
Things in the right direction	-0.299	<.001					-0.271	<.001
Interests of ethnic minorities taken into account	-0.009	0.833					-0.01	0.773
Estonia better than many other countries	-0.03	0.409					-0.034	0.272
Strong confidence in EE armed forces	-0.232	<.001					-0.241	<.001
Social liberalism index	0.016	0.603					0	1
Adjusted R-sq.	0.507		0.144		0.139		0.518	

Appendix EE_F. Fascism is on the rise in Estonia

	Combined model		Model MC		Model SD		Model PA	
	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.
Printed media in Estonian	0.053	0.199	-0.02	0.582				
Printed media in Russian	-0.008	0.837	0.04	0.277				
TV in Estonian	-0.029	0.589	-0.113	0.018				
ETV+	-0.022	0.598	-0.06	0.095				
TV broadcasts from Russia	0.134	0.001	0.288	<.001				
Radio in Estonian	-0.086	0.073	-0.19	<.001				
Radio in Russian	0.071	0.143	0.144	<.001				
Portals in Estonian	-0.007	0.889	-0.082	0.046				
Portals in Russian	-0.173	0.006	-0.201	<.001				
Social media in Estonian	-0.068	0.109	0.021	0.591				
Social media in Russian	0.077	0.214	-0.014	0.797				
Communication apps in Estonian	0.063	0.122	0.057	0.116				
Communication apps in Russian	-0.005	0.914	0.059	0.185				
Female	0.132	<.001			0.104	0.002		
Age	-0.156	<.001			-0.184	<.001		
Estonian language at home	0.056	0.4			-0.313	<.001		
Education	-0.027	0.435			-0.056	0.106		
Personal income	-0.011	0.798			-0.059	0.162		
Household income	-0.002	0.958			-0.024	0.548		
Life in Soviet times better	0.215	<.001					0.217	<.001
Good use of taxpayers' money	0.01	0.844					0.089	0.048
Ethnic minorities have the same opportunities	-0.19	<.001					-0.244	<.001
Things in the right direction	-0.008	0.885					-0.049	0.301
Interests of ethnic minorities taken into account	-0.13	0.009					-0.141	0.001
Estonia better than many other countries	-0.092	0.031					-0.042	0.27
Strong confidence in EE armed forces	-0.038	0.412					-0.141	<.001
Social liberalism index	0.082	0.025					0.074	0.015
Adjusted R-sq.	0.372		0.226		0.160		0.331	

Appendix EE_G. Ukraine as a country is an anti-Russian project funded by the West to destabilize Russia

	Combined model		Model MC		Model SD		Model PA	
	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.
Printed media in Estonian	-0.006	0.885	-0.017	0.641				
Printed media in Russian	-0.01	0.79	0.003	0.934				
TV in Estonian	0.06	0.221	-0.037	0.431				
ETV+	-0.076	0.057	-0.023	0.526				
TV broadcasts from Russia	0.064	0.1	0.258	<.001				
Radio in Estonian	-0.074	0.095	-0.128	0.003				
Radio in Russian	0.159	<.001	0.169	<.001				
Portals in Estonian	0.027	0.549	-0.115	0.005				
Portals in Russian	-0.057	0.326	0.008	0.874				
Social media in Estonian	0.025	0.526	0.029	0.449				
Social media in Russian	-0.062	0.275	-0.07	0.182				
Communication apps in Estonian	0.035	0.356	0.051	0.165				
Communication apps in Russian	-0.066	0.155	0.019	0.666				
Female	0.147	<.001			0.103	0.001		
Age	0.077	0.039			0.076	0.019		
Estonian language at home	-0.139	0.024			-0.355	<.001		
Education	-0.081	0.014			-0.151	<.001		
Personal income	-0.104	0.009			-0.133	<.001		
Household income	0.013	0.719			-0.013	0.728		
Life in Soviet times better	0.215	<.001					0.272	<.001
Good use of taxpayers' money	-0.059	0.207					-0.081	0.053
Ethnic minorities have the same opportunities	-0.064	0.13					-0.107	0.005
Things in the right direction	-0.13	0.008					-0.119	0.006
Interests of ethnic minorities taken into account	-0.024	0.603					-0.094	0.018
Estonia better than many other countries	-0.094	0.019					-0.049	0.162
Strong confidence in EE armed forces	-0.142	0.001					-0.135	<.001
Social liberalism index	-0.018	0.589					-0.081	0.004
Adjusted R-sq.	0.447		0.206		0.210		0.416	

Appendix LT_A. It makes sense to resist a foreign invasion

	Combined model		Model MC		Model SD		Model PA	
	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.
Printed media in Lithuanian	0.013	0.68	0.039	0.205				
Printed media in Russian	-0.052	0.132	-0.02	0.572				
TV in Lithuanian	-0.054	0.117	0.033	0.325				
TV broadcasts from Russia	-0.056	0.099	-0.139	<.001				
Radio in Lithuanian	-0.042	0.181	-0.019	0.549				
Radio in Russian	0.039	0.25	-0.086	0.009				
Portals in Lithuanian	-0.037	0.277	0.052	0.123				
Portals in Russian	0.046	0.209	0.039	0.282				
Social media in Lithuanian	0.006	0.862	0.029	0.404				
Social media in Russian	-0.01	0.768	-0.117	<.001				
Communication apps in Lithuanian	-0.017	0.605	-0.055	0.099				
Communication apps in Russian	-0.05	0.159	-0.009	0.804				
Female	-0.078	0.013			-0.097	0.002		
Age	0.067	0.049			0.077	0.014		
Lithuanian language at home	-0.027	0.392			0.059	0.047		
Education	-0.02	0.51			0.058	0.068		
Personal income	0.107	0.01			0.152	<.001		
Household income	-0.076	0.056			0.029	0.484		
Life in Soviet times better	-0.207	<.001					-0.189	<.001
Good use of taxpayers' money	0.048	0.212					0.035	0.29
Ethnic minorities have the same opportunities	0.116	0.001					0.115	<.001
Things in the right direction	0.189	<.001					0.167	<.001
Interests of ethnic minorities taken into account	-0.016	0.656					-0.016	0.602
Lithuania better than many other countries	0.028	0.438					0.077	0.012
Strong confidence in LT armed forces	0.189	<.001					0.199	<.001
Social liberalism index	0.026	0.387					0.035	0.143
Adjusted R-sq.	0.362		0.062		0.052		0.333	

Appendix LT_B. I am willing to fight for Lithuania

	Combined model		Model MC		Model SD		Model PA	
	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.
Printed media in Lithuanian	0.055	0.068	0.117	<.001				
Printed media in Russian	0.028	0.411	0.05	0.145				
TV in Lithuanian	0.001	0.975	0.079	0.017				
TV broadcasts from Russia	-0.102	0.003	-0.163	<.001				
Radio in Lithuanian	0.082	0.009	0.109	<.001				
Radio in Russian	0.019	0.572	-0.085	0.01				
Portals in Lithuanian	-0.015	0.644	0.028	0.407				
Portals in Russian	0.031	0.393	0.016	0.667				
Social media in Lithuanian	0.038	0.27	0.02	0.555				
Social media in Russian	0.031	0.368	-0.034	0.298				
Communication apps in Lithuanian	-0.016	0.633	-0.051	0.116				
Communication apps in Russian	-0.035	0.32	-0.011	0.759				
Female	-0.227	<.001			-0.244	<.001		
Age	0.025	0.45			0.039	0.202		
Lithuanian language at home	0.013	0.669			0.106	<.001		
Education	-0.064	0.033			0.036	0.248		
Personal income	0.035	0.393			0.091	0.033		
Household income	-0.045	0.255			0.023	0.572		
Life in Soviet times better	-0.095	0.009					-0.067	0.022
Good use of taxpayers' money	0.081	0.033					0.069	0.041
Ethnic minorities have the same opportunities	0.081	0.024					0.115	<.001
Things in the right direction	0.042	0.32					0.083	0.031
Interests of ethnic minorities taken into account	-0.025	0.471					-0.033	0.28
Lithuania better than many other countries	0.161	<.001					0.123	<.001
Strong confidence in LT armed forces	0.253	<.001					0.291	<.001
Social liberalism index	-0.052	0.085					-0.004	0.871
Adjusted R-sq.	0.389		0.087		0.086		0.308	

Appendix LT_C. NATO will not protect Lithuania

	Combined model		Model MC		Model SD		Model PA	
	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.
Printed media in Lithuanian	-0.012	0.682	-0.066	0.028				
Printed media in Russian	-0.055	0.095	-0.048	0.159				
TV in Lithuanian	0.019	0.568	-0.059	0.068				
TV broadcasts from Russia	0.037	0.26	0.138	<.001				
Radio in Lithuanian	-0.014	0.646	-0.023	0.448				
Radio in Russian	0.067	0.037	0.115	<.001				
Portals in Lithuanian	0.002	0.96	-0.036	0.27				
Portals in Russian	0.044	0.207	0.092	0.009				
Social media in Lithuanian	0.003	0.93	-0.031	0.343				
Social media in Russian	0.071	0.032	0.127	<.001				
Communication apps in Lithuanian	-0.007	0.825	0.035	0.27				
Communication apps in Russian	-0.01	0.778	-0.017	0.608				
Female	0.065	0.03			0.102	<.001		
Age	0.001	0.964			0.025	0.417		
Lithuanian language at home	-0.084	0.005			-0.157	<.001		
Education	0.026	0.362			-0.056	0.074		
Personal income	-0.04	0.321			-0.088	0.04		
Household income	0.007	0.845			-0.099	0.017		
Life in Soviet times better	0.208	<.001					0.271	<.001
Good use of taxpayers' money	-0.124	<.001					-0.13	<.001
Ethnic minorities have the same opportunities	0.038	0.278					0.03	0.27
Things in the right direction	-0.146	<.001					-0.152	<.001
Interests of ethnic minorities taken into account	0.007	0.835					0.007	0.801
Lithuania better than many other countries	0.033	0.342					0.041	0.152
Strong confidence in LT armed forces	-0.273	<.001					-0.312	<.001
Social liberalism index	0.022	0.452					0.008	0.736
Adjusted R-sq.	0.416		0.104		0.072		0.424	

Appendix LT_D. NATO will not protect Lithuania

	Combined model		Model MC		Model SD		Model PA	
	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.
Printed media in Lithuanian	0.025	0.325	0.06	0.033				
Printed media in Russian	-0.015	0.59	-0.017	0.605				
TV in Lithuanian	0.041	0.154	0.123	<.001				
TV broadcasts from Russia	-0.075	0.007	-0.194	<.001				
Radio in Lithuanian	0.063	0.016	0.066	0.022				
Radio in Russian	0.013	0.63	-0.085	0.005				
Portals in Lithuanian	0.05	0.072	0.135	<.001				
Portals in Russian	-0.038	0.202	-0.087	0.009				
Social media in Lithuanian	0.019	0.51	0.034	0.269				
Social media in Russian	0.045	0.114	-0.066	0.029				
Communication apps in Lithuanian	0.004	0.883	-0.047	0.122				
Communication apps in Russian	-0.02	0.504	0.037	0.25				
Female	-0.057	0.027			-0.103	<.001		
Age	0.027	0.338			0.058	0.052		
Lithuanian language at home	0.051	0.049			0.187	<.001		
Education	-0.018	0.461			0.057	0.059		
Personal income	0.122	<.001			0.199	<.001		
Household income	-0.026	0.427			0.037	0.347		
Life in Soviet times better	-0.193	<.001					-0.236	<.001
Good use of taxpayers' money	-0.035	0.267					-0.044	0.112
Ethnic minorities have the same opportunities	0.084	0.005					0.097	<.001
Things in the right direction	0.204	<.001					0.206	<.001
Interests of ethnic minorities taken into account	0.035	0.228					0.062	0.013
Lithuania better than many other countries	0.08	0.008					0.084	<.001
Strong confidence in LT armed forces	0.256	<.001					0.306	<.001
Social liberalism index	0.056	0.023					0.07	<.001
Adjusted R-sq.	0.557		0.177		0.107		0.527	

Appendix LT_E. Europe is in moral decay

	Combined model		Model MC		Model SD		Model PA	
	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.
Printed media in Lithuanian	-0.005	0.885	-0.003	0.912				
Printed media in Russian	0	0.993	-0.009	0.799				
TV in Lithuanian	-0.063	0.099	-0.07	0.036				
TV broadcasts from Russia	-0.056	0.13	0.071	0.037				
Radio in Lithuanian	-0.017	0.631	-0.044	0.166				
Radio in Russian	0.013	0.717	0.023	0.478				
Portals in Lithuanian	-0.022	0.557	-0.012	0.725				
Portals in Russian	0.052	0.194	0.112	0.002				
Social media in Lithuanian	0.013	0.721	-0.032	0.35				
Social media in Russian	-0.018	0.625	0.076	0.023				
Communication apps in Lithuanian	0.018	0.619	0.009	0.786				
Communication apps in Russian	0.023	0.558	-0.031	0.381				
Female	-0.021	0.53			0.021	0.496		
Age	0.125	<.001			0.109	<.001		
Lithuanian language at home	-0.008	0.811			-0.051	0.088		
Education	0.037	0.261			-0.006	0.858		
Personal income	0.046	0.314			-0.018	0.673		
Household income	-0.074	0.088			-0.128	0.002		
Life in Soviet times better	0.095	0.016					0.159	<.001
Good use of taxpayers' money	-0.194	<.001					-0.204	<.001
Ethnic minorities have the same opportunities	-0.012	0.762					0.029	0.353
Things in the right direction	-0.301	<.001					-0.267	<.001
Interests of ethnic minorities taken into account	0.023	0.558					0.015	0.643
Lithuania better than many other countries	0.098	0.014					0.11	<.001
Strong confidence in LT armed forces	-0.038	0.383					-0.058	0.104
Social liberalism index	0.021	0.525					0.009	0.733
Adjusted R-sq.	0.235		0.042		0.034		0.232	

Appendix LT_F. Fascism is on rise in Lithuania

	Combined model		Model MC		Model SD		Model PA	
	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.
Printed media in Lithuanian	-0.023	0.457	-0.065	0.028				
Printed media in Russian	-0.006	0.871	0.022	0.526				
TV in Lithuanian	-0.01	0.778	-0.028	0.402				
TV broadcasts from Russia	0.049	0.149	0.135	<.001				
Radio in Lithuanian	0.014	0.653	-0.006	0.837				
Radio in Russian	0.086	0.01	0.134	<.001				
Portals in Lithuanian	0.037	0.278	-0.078	0.019				
Portals in Russian	0.071	0.049	0.073	0.042				
Social media in Lithuanian	-0.054	0.117	-0.041	0.214				
Social media in Russian	0.001	0.965	0.098	0.003				
Communication apps in Lithuanian	0.025	0.446	0.073	0.024				
Communication apps in Russian	-0.022	0.531	-0.016	0.638				
Female	0.033	0.283			0.061	0.046		
Age	-0.087	0.01			-0.089	0.004		
Lithuanian language at home	-0.009	0.776			-0.119	<.001		
Education	-0.027	0.366			-0.148	<.001		
Personal income	-0.062	0.133			-0.132	0.002		
Household income	0.024	0.536			-0.078	0.055		
Life in Soviet times better	0.294	<.001					0.368	<.001
Good use of taxpayers' money	-0.009	0.81					0.006	0.862
Ethnic minorities have the same opportunities	-0.154	<.001					-0.171	<.001
Things in the right direction	-0.12	0.005					-0.084	0.02
Interests of ethnic minorities taken into account	-0.062	0.082					-0.093	0.002
Lithuania better than many other countries	-0.015	0.679					-0.027	0.368
Strong confidence in LT armed forces	-0.053	0.182					-0.082	0.012
Social liberalism index	-0.028	0.355					0.003	0.906
Adjusted R-sq.	0.380		0.117		0.094		0.369	

Appendix LT_G. Ukraine as a country is an anti-Russian project funded by the West to destabilize Russia

	Combined model		Model MC		Model SD		Model PA	
	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.	Std Beta	Sig.
Printed media in Lithuanian	-0.014	0.68	-0.03	0.34				
Printed media in Russian	-0.034	0.379	-0.007	0.853				
TV in Lithuanian	0.087	0.025	0.074	0.029				
TV broadcasts from Russia	0.08	0.038	0.168	<.001				
Radio in Lithuanian	0.047	0.182	0.018	0.571				
Radio in Russian	0.019	0.607	0.066	0.049				
Portals in Lithuanian	0.009	0.803	-0.006	0.862				
Portals in Russian	0.039	0.345	0.058	0.125				
Social media in Lithuanian	-0.059	0.127	-0.08	0.023				
Social media in Russian	0.11	0.005	0.185	<.001				
Communication apps in Lithuanian	0.053	0.151	0.061	0.071				
Communication apps in Russian	-0.044	0.266	-0.054	0.136				
Female	0.076	0.03			0.084	0.008		
Age	0.065	0.089			0.117	<.001		
Lithuanian language at home	-0.051	0.147			-0.128	<.001		
Education	-0.031	0.368			-0.107	<.001		
Personal income	-0.042	0.372			-0.101	0.023		
Household income	0.026	0.56			-0.046	0.28		
Life in Soviet times better	0.241	<.001					0.336	<.001
Good use of taxpayers' money	-0.07	0.106					-0.078	0.038
Ethnic minorities have the same opportunities	-0.024	0.551					-0.04	0.235
Things in the right direction	-0.089	0.068					-0.078	0.064
Interests of ethnic minorities taken into account	-0.032	0.429					-0.019	0.579
Lithuania better than many other countries	0.017	0.671					0.025	0.474
Strong confidence in LT armed forces	-0.037	0.401					-0.024	0.529
Social liberalism index	-0.055	0.104					-0.067	0.015
Adjusted R-sq.	0.238		0.096		0.073		0.200	

